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Abstract
Maximizing the probability of bypassing an aspiration level, and taking in-
creasing risks to recover previous losses are well-documented behavioral tenden-
cies. They are compatible with individual utility functions that are S-shaped, as
suggested in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). We explore evolu-
tionary foundations for such preferences. Idiosyncratic innovative activity, while in-
dividually risky, enhances the Þtness of society because it provides hedging against
aggregate disasters that might occur if everybody had pursued the same course of
action. In order that individuals choose the socially optimal dosage of innovative
activity, the individuals preferences should make them strive to improve upon the
on-going convention, even if it implies taking gambles that reduce their expected
achievements. We show how, in a formal model, the preferences that will be selected
for in the course of evolution lead to maximizing the probability of bypassing an
aspiration level. Furthermore, when comparing choices with the same probability
of achieving this goal, preference is indeed established by maximizing the expected
utility of an S-shaped utility function  exhibiting risk loving below the aspiration
level and risk aversion beyond it.
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1 Introduction
Escalation of commitment is typical to human decision making in a wide range of circum-
stances. When people make consecutive choices under risk and Þnd themselves losing in
the Þrst rounds, they often tend to choose riskier actions, with negative expected gains,
if there is a positive chance to make up for some of their previous losses (Janis and
Mann (1977), Staw (1997)). Investors are reluctant to realize their losses in the stock
market, and hold losing investment too long, hoping they would bounce back (Shefrin
and Statman 1985, Odean 1998, Weber and Camerer 1998). Bowman (1980, 1982) Þnds
indications that troubled Þrms take riskier decisions than successful Þrms. Towards the
end of the day, racetrack gamblers tend to shift their bets to longshots, which have the
potential of swiftly covering their losses earlier that day (McGlothlin 1956, Ali 1977).
Workers do not cut down their consumption when their salary is reduced (Shea 1995),
which eﬀectively amounts to betting that their wage will be augmented in the future
and compensate for the current relative over-spending. (Bowman, Minehart and Rabin
1999). People who purchased full-price theater tickets attended plays in greater number
than people who purchased equivalent tickets at a discount (Arkes and Blumer 1985),
thus exhibiting the Sunk-Cost Fallacy.
Escalation of commitment is tied to a target or goal that the decision maker strives
to reach, even by exposing herself to a risk of increasing losses. Risky actions may then
be judged primarily by the probability of achieving this aspiration level. Such a goal
seeking type of behavior was demonstrated for example by Camerer et al. (1997). They
found that taxi drivers choose their work hours according to a daily goal of income or
length, and stick to it in good days with many clients as well as in weak days with few
clients. This behavior violates not only the permanent income hypothesis (which may
not be that surprising) but also the maximization of short term utility. Another example
is the deÞnition given by chief Þnancial oﬃcers of Fortune 500 Þrms to the term risk
as the probability of not achieving the target rate of return (cited in De Bondt and
Makhija 1988). The same deÞnition is reported by Mao (1970), and it also came up as
the result of a suitable experiment (described in Libby and Fishburn (1977)).
Escalation of commitment and goal seeking are compatible with Kahneman and Tver-
skys (1979,1981) Prospect Theory. The theory uses an S-shaped utility function, where
the inßection point is at the decision makers reference point. With such preferences
individuals become risk loving after a loss, and are willing to take bets in which they
lose on average but have the potential of recovering the loss. Escalation of commitment
follows since the bigger the loss, the bigger the stakes which are needed and accepted in
order to recapitulate it (Thaler (1980), De Bondt and Makhija (1988)).
Prospect theory is also compatible with many other observed biases (see e.g. Camerer
2000), especially with its further reÞnement on cumulative, non-linear probability assess-
ments (Kahneman and Tversky 1992) . In the Security-Potential/Aspiration theory of
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Lopes and Oden (1999), such weighting of probabilities is augmented by an explicit cri-
terion of achieving an aspiration level with a high probability. They show that in certain
contexts, their theorys predictive power supersedes that of Prospect Theory.1
The above-mentioned models are descriptive - they deliver predictions on the way peo-
ple behave, but they do not explain why they behave in this way. Recently, an emerging
literature (see e.g. Heifetz and Spiegel 2000 and the references therein) tries to use evo-
lutionary processes to explain and endogenize preferences. According to this approach,
the preference relation itself is a property which was selected for by evolutionary pres-
sures under varying conditions. The Þrst step in a typical model of this kind is to deÞne
the conditions under which the preferences have been formed along the history. Those
conditions determine the characteristics of the selected preferences which are observed
today, even if the current conditions are already diﬀerent than the historical ones.
Some of these models discuss the evolution of attitudes towards risk. Dekel and
Scotchmer (1999) show that with winner takes all games (where the individual with
the highest payoﬀ is the only one to reproduce), preference for tail-dominant gambles
will take over. Robson (1996b) uses a version with a weaker beneÞt to the winner, and
shows that the selected types may like fair bets, i.e. they are not necessarily risk averse.
Robson (1996a) shows that in the presence of aggregate risk, preference for dominated
gambles may emerge  the selected type is strictly less averse to idiosyncratic risk than to
risk which is correlated across all individuals. Bergstrom (1997) shows how the presence
of aggregate risk induces preference for mixed strategies.
In this paper we propose a possible insight for the evolutionary emergence of goal-
seeking and escalating behavior. Like Robson (1996a) and Bergstrom (1997), we build
upon the discrepancy between individual and social motives in the presence of aggregate
risk. In such a setting, diversiÞcation across individuals makes society more immune
to aggregate risks which menace beaten-track courses of action. It is socially beneÞcial
that individuals invest some of their resources in idiosyncratic new directions, even if on
average these explorations yield, for each individual, less than the mainstream convention.
For example, it is not advisable that everybody grows wheat exclusively in the same,
state-of-the-art technique, because that technique might nevertheless become vulnerable
to some new decease which is yet to appear. Rather, it is preferable that individuals
devote a part of their Þeld to experimenting with their own ideas on wheat cultivation.
Some of these ideas will supercede the convention, and become tomorrows standard. But
1There are also earlier attempts in the literature to devise a concise model congruent with types of
behavior which are incompatible with von-Neuman Morgenstern expected utility theory. Friedman and
Savage (1948) used local convexity of the utility function to explain the co-existence of the demand for
both insurance and gambling. Markowitz (1952) used local convexities with a wealth dependent reference
point, assuming that the rich have a higher reference point than the poor. This assumption enabled
solving few diﬃculties in the Friedman and Savage model. More generally, Landsberger and Meilijson
(1990) introduced star-shaped utility functions. Such functions can have local convexities, and the
induced preference relation is compatible with reasonable partial preference orders on gambles. In
particular, such utility functions are compatible with buying lotteries and insurance at the same time.
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even if most new techniques yield less wheat than the current standard, at least some
of them will yield wheat which is immune to the new decease, simply by virtue of being
diﬀerent.
Thus, individual experimentation can provide beneÞcial hedging against social aggre-
gate risks. However, such experimentation may be very risky in individual terms. While
the idiosyncratic risks of the individual experiments are, by and large, diversiÞed away
in aggregate terms in a large population, each individual bears it in full. In individual
eyes, the risk of producing less if the experiment fails, and consequently supporting less
descendants, may be substantially bigger than the risk of some future decease which
appears only once in a dozen generations. This possibility might be so remote that in
practice, the individual may not even be aware of this collective danger.
How can, therefore, individuals be induced to choose the socially optimal dosage of
experimentation in such settings? What preferences for gambles should be hard-wired
in their brains to this eﬀect? This is the question which we are out to explore in this
work. It is a vital question because when preferences are inherited by descendents, we
show that in the long run individuals with the socially optimal preferences will almost
surely outnumber individuals with other preferences.
What we Þnd is that the optimal preferences imply, indeed, goal-seeking and escalat-
ing behavior. The individuals of the victorious type are decisive in their wish to improve
upon their current situation and bypass a certain aspiration level. They derive enormous
satisfaction from fulÞlling this aspiration, and the hope for this fulÞllment overshadows
in their minds the risks in the involved choices. They are thus risk loving as long as
they are below the aspiration level, and risk averse beyond it. Technically, they evaluate
gambles with an S-shaped utility function, which has an inÞnite jump at the aspiration
level.
Such preferences turn to be socially optimal because they combine two balancing
features. On one hand, individuals set up their aspiration level somewhat above their
current status, and therefore their choices will always involve some positive degree of
experimentation (as socially commanded), since this is the only way which can lead them
to fulÞl their aspirations with a positive probability. Thus, the social motive of hedging
against aggregate risks is fulÞlled by the individual motive to improve ones status in life.
On the other hand, individuals are nevertheless risk averse when they compare outcomes
beyond their aspiration level. This leads them to limit the amount of experimentation in
their action portfolio, which is again in line with the social interests: After all, hedging
against collective risks impedes growth most of the time, and it is therefore socially
desirable only to a limited extent.
Our model is akin to that of Bergstrom (1997). In the model, individuals confront in
their lifetime one out of a host of decision problems, all with a similar structure. In each
of them, the individuals have to decide how to divide their resources between two actions:
The conservative one, which ensures a good outcome (normalized to 1) in good times, but
very rarely, in bad times, yields nothing; and the innovative one, which turns sour (less
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than 1) more often than it turns sweet (more than 1), but irrespective of whether the times
are good or bad for the conservative action. The number of descendents each individual
has is linear in the above outcome, and these descendents inherit the preferences of the
parent.
For each of the decision problems, we show how to calculate the Genes optimal
choice, where the Gene is a metaphorical entity interested in maximizing the long term
growth of its carriers, and the choice is a division of the resources between the conservative
action and the innovative action. To this eﬀect, we devise the Gene with a utility function
(which depends on the parameters of the problem), the maximization of which yields that
optimal choice. We show that the Genes utility function indeed represents the interests
of the Gene in a strong sense: If every generation faced the same problem, and one choice
is better than another according to the Genes utility function, then a sub-society that
consistently makes the inferior choice will almost surely become asymptotically extinct
relative to a sub-society that sticks with the superior choice.
The environment in our model is not invariant, though, so for maximizing long-term
prosperity it is not enough to pass from generation to generation just one recipe of one
optimal choice. Rather, it is a decision rule that has to be implemented, a rule which
results in the Genes optimal choices in each decision problem drawn from a big family
of problems. To achieve this, the Gene should choose appropriate preferences to be
planted in the individuals minds. These preferences should induce the individuals
to make the appropriate choices when they confront the problem of their generation,
even though they are not aware of the collective risk associated the conservative course
of action, as this risk has materialized, if at all, so many generations ago, and in a
somewhat diﬀerent environment.
Though the story about the Gene selecting individual preferences is only a metaphor,
it is a useful one. The optimal preferences from the point of view of the Gene are the
ones which the model predicts to persist and take over the population in the long run,
in a selection process in which less successful preferences are gradually wiped out by
more successful ones. We will show that the persistent preferences all have the same
structure  they all cause the individuals to maximize the probability of bypassing a
certain aspiration level. Furthermore, the optimal preferences of the individuals can be
represented by the expectation of an S-shaped utility function  convex for losses and
concave for gains.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model. Section
3 explores the evolutionary dynamics in constant and in varying environments, and it
contains the calculation of the choices that will be preferred by the evolutionary pressures.
Section 4 continues with the deÞnition of the optimization problem from the individuals
perspective. The characterization of the suitable utility functions is carried out in section
5. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The model
Consider a large population of similar individuals in a multi-period world. There are
two possible states of nature which may occur at each period  good or bad. The
probability of the bad state is drawn independently across periods from some distribution
G with average q. The average probability q of the bad state is very close to zero. Thus,
the time between two occurrences of the bad state is very large on average.
In each period every individual has to choose how to divide her resources between
two actions  a conservative action and an innovative action. The state of nature
determines the payoﬀs of the actions, and hence also the overall payoﬀ to each mixture
of them in the individuals choices. It is assumed that the population reproduces itself in
every period, and the Þtness of every individual  the number of her oﬀspring  is linear
in her payoﬀ in the same period.
In each period the conservative action yields a payoﬀ of 1 in the good state, and a
payoﬀ of 0 in the bad state. Since the state of nature is common to all the individuals in
a certain period, the conservative action is socially (or biologically) risky. The innovative
action yields the result of the following gamble, independently of the state of nature :
a payoﬀ of 1 + c with probability p, or a payoﬀ of 1 − c with probability 1 − p, where
the parameters c > 0 and 0 < p < 0.5 may change from period to period. The gambles
are independent across individuals. As explained in the introduction, they represent
idiosyncratic innovative endeavors. By virtue of being diﬀerent from the conservative
action, they are assumed to be unaﬀected by the danger to the latter in the bad state.
We are particularly interested in cases in which p < 0.5, because this means that
the expected payoﬀ from the innovative action is less than 1. For low values of p, a
risk averse individual will choose to invest her resources only in the conservative action.
If everybody chooses to do so in every period, the entire population will be wiped oﬀ
when eventually a bad state occurs. This contrast between the individual risk and the
aggregate risk is a key factor in the model and the results.
The choice of an individual is a mixture (1 − s, s) between the two actions. The
interpretation we give to such a mixture is that the individual invests parts of her available
eﬀort in each of the actions. Consequently, the payoﬀ to the choice is the corresponding
weighted average of the actions payoﬀs, not of a gamble between the two actions. Thus,
in the good state a mixture of (1− s, s) yields a payoﬀ of 1 + sc with probability p, and
payoﬀ of 1− sc with probability 1− p.
Good State (prob. 1− q) Bad State (prob. q)
Conservative (1− s) 1 0
Innovative (s)
½
1 + c, with probability p
1− c, with probability 1− p
½
1 + c, with probability p
1− c, with probability 1− p
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As explained in the introduction, we assume that individuals are not even aware of the
bad state, possibly because it has materialized such a long time ago, and in a somewhat
diﬀerent environment (diﬀerent c and p).
From a social vista point, on the other hand, things look diﬀerent. A population of
individuals who all choose the mixture (1−s, s) will get an average payoﬀ of 1−sc(1−2p)
in the good state (i.e. with probability 1− q), and s− sc(1− 2p) in the bad state (with
probability q). The direct consequences of this are explored in the following section.
3 The evolutionary dynamics
Denote by Xst the size of a large population at the beginning of period t, the individuals
of which all choose to invest part s of their eﬀort in the innovative action in period t. We
assume that the number of oﬀspring of an individual is linear in her payoﬀ. Furthermore,
since the population is large, we assume that the strong law of large numbers obtains.
Thus, for some coeﬃcient kt, the random variables X
s
t and X
s
t+1 are related by
2
Xst+1 = ktX
s
t ·
½
1− sc(1− 2p) good state at t, probability 1− q
s− sc(1− 2p) bad state at t, probability q (3.1)
Assume, Þrst, that the parameters s and c do not change across periods. What is the
mixture (1 − s, s) between the actions which will maximize the size of the population
in the long run? Along history, good states appear in portion (1 − q) of the periods,
and bad states occur in portion q of the periods. Choosing the mixture (1 − s, s) will
therefore yield an average growth rate proportional to
F (s) = [1− sc(1− 2p)]1−q [s− sc(1− 2p)]q (3.2)
Imagine now a Gene as a metaphorical subject, who can instruct its carriers to choose
a speciÞc mixture (1− s, s), and this instruction is inherited by descendents. The Gene
is interested in the long term growth rate of its carriers. We now show that the function
F (s) represents the Genes utility function in a strong sense: Higher values of F imply,
almost surely, relative domination of the population in the long run.
Proposition 1 For any two diﬀerent proportions s, s0 ∈ [0, 1] of investment in the in-
novative action, F (s0) < F (s) if and only if a population that consistently chooses the
2The coeﬃcients kt may depend on exogenous conditions (like climate changes or food availability) or
even on the size of the entire population
R 1
0
Xst ds at time t. The size of kt will not inßuence the analysis
below, since we are interested in the relative success of investment choices and not in the absolute size
of the population.
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proportion s0 will almost surely become asymptotically extinct relative to a population that
consistently chooses the proportion s, i.e.
lim
t→∞
Xst
Xs
0
t
=∞
almost surely.
Proof. DeÞne the diﬀerences
δs,s
0
t = log
Xst+1
Xs
0
t+1
− log X
s
t
Xs
0
t
. (3.3)
According to (3.1),
δs,s
0
t =
(
1−sc(1−2p)
1−s0c(1−2p) good state at t, probability 1− q
s−sc(1−2p)
s−s0c(1−2p) bad state at t, probability q
(3.4)
Summing these diﬀerences across periods yields
log
Xst
Xs
0
t
= log
Xs0
Xs
0
0
+
t−1X
τ=0
δs,s
0
τ (3.5)
Since the state of the world  good or bad  is determined independently across periods,
the random variables δs,s
0
t are i.i.d., with expectation
Eδ ≡ Eδs,s0t = logF (s)− logF (s0) (3.6)
Thus, there are two cases:
(i) F (s) > F (s0). In this case Eδ > 0, so by the strong law of large numbers
1
t
log
Xst
Xs
0
t
=
1
t
log
Xs0
Xs
0
0
+
1
t
t−1X
τ=0
δs,s
0
τ
a.s.−→
t→∞
Eδ > 0 (3.7)
Hence, in this case
Xst
Xs
0
t
a.s.−→
t→∞
∞ (3.8)
(ii) F (s) = F (s0). In this case Eδ = 0, and by the central limit theorem we have
1√
t
log
Xst
Xs
0
t
=
1√
t
log
Xs0
Xs
0
0
+
1√
t
t−1X
τ=0
δs,s
0
τ
D−→
t→∞
N(0, var(δ)) (3.9)
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where var(δ) = var(δs,s
0
t ). Therefore, in this case
Xst
Xs
0
t
does not converge to inÞnity almost
surely. ¥
What is, therefore, the mixture (1 − s∗, s∗) which will maximize long term growth?
Proposition 1 implies that s∗ is the maximizer of F (s), which is
s∗ = arg max
s∈[0,1]
F (s) =
½ q
c(1−2p) for p ∈ (0, 12 − q2c)
1 for p > 1
2
− q
2c
(3.10)
The following graph depicts s∗ as a function of p:
 
0 0.5 1
0
1
p
s*
q/c
Figure 1. The socially optimal level of investment s∗ in innovation as a
function of its success probability p
Inverting this relation we get that
p =
1
2
− q
2s∗c
=
s∗c− q
2s∗c
,
q
c
< s∗ < 1. (3.11)
If each generation had been facing exactly the same decision problem (with some
Þxed, speciÞc parameters p, c, q), the design problem for the Gene would have been
relatively simple: All that would have been needed is to program the individuals to
consistently devote the proportion s∗ of their resources to experimentation.
9
However, the environment does change from generation to generation. In our model,
the parameters p, c, q may be diﬀerent across periods. What has to be programed and
inherited by descendents, therefore, is a decision rule which will induce them to choose
the appropriate s∗ as a function of the parameters p and c that they can assess. In the
next section we shall show how this can be done by endowing individuals with a suitable
utility function.
4 The individual perspective
As explained in the introduction, we assume that individuals are unaware of the bad state
of nature associated with their decision problem. Although bad states have appeared,
in most of the periods such occurrences are way far in the past, and associated with
environments which are diﬀerent than the current one.
Thus, we assume that individuals choose that division of resources between the actions
which maximizes the expectation of their utility V from the payoﬀs they perceive as
possible in the good state. With the mixture (1− s, s), these payoﬀs are 1+ sc when the
innovative action is successful (probability p) and 1− sc when it fails (probability 1− p).
The individual maximization problem is therefore given by
max
s∈[0,1]
pV (1 + sc) + (1− p)V (1− sc) (4.1)
Suppose that the utility function V is inherited by descendents (possibly by a combi-
nation of biological reproduction and education). Proposition 1 implies that individuals
with a utility function for which
s∗ = arg max
s∈[0,1]
[pV (1 + sc) + (1− p)V (1− sc)] (4.2)
for every combination of parameters p and c will take over the population in the long
run. This is because they will choose the socially optimal s∗ in each and every generation,
whatever are the parameters of the decision problem to face. In metaphorical terms, a
way for the Gene to implement its desired decision rule is to endow individuals with such
a utility function.
When s∗ ∈ ( q
c
, 1), substituting (3.11) in the Þrst order condition for (4.2) yields
V 0(1 + s∗c)
V 0(1− s∗c) =
1− p
p
=
1− ¡1
2
− q
2s∗c
¢
1
2
− q
2s∗c
=
s∗c+ q
s∗c− q ,
q
c
< s∗ < 1. (4.3)
By substituting x = s∗c, this relation becomes
V 0(1 + x)
V 0(1− x) =
x+ q
x− q , q < x < c. (4.4)
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We should now verify that a utility function which satisÞes the Þrst order condition (4.3)
achieves indeed a maximum at s∗.
Claim 1 Every strictly increasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable utility function
V which satisÞes (4.3) achieves a maximum at s∗ when (4.3) is satisÞed
Proof. Substituting (3.11) into the Þrst order condition (4.3) yieldsµ
1
2
− q
2s∗c
¶
V 0(1 + s∗c) +
·
1−
µ
1
2
− q
2s∗c
¶¸
V 0(1− s∗c) = 0, q
c
< s∗ < 1 (4.5)
or, equivalently
V 0(1 + s∗c)− s
∗c + q
s∗c− qV
0(1− s∗c) = 0, q
c
< s∗ < 1. (4.6)
Since this relation holds in an interval, we can diﬀerentiate with respect to s∗ and get
cV 00(1 + s∗c) + c
s∗c+ q
s∗c− qV
00(1− s∗c) + 2cq
(s∗c− q)2V
0(1− s∗c) = 0, (4.7)
implying that
s∗c− q
2s∗c
V 00(1 + s∗c) +
s∗c+ q
2s∗c
V 00(1− s∗c) = − q
s∗c (s∗c− q)V
0(1− s∗c) < 0 (4.8)
which is the desired second order condition
pV 00(1 + s∗c) + (1− p)V 00(1− s∗c) < 0. (4.9)
¥
5 Properties of a suitable utility function V
Equation (4.4) does not pin down a unique utility function V. However, as the following
proposition shows, all the suitable functions V have an inÞnite jump at 1 + q. This
follows from the hedging requirement that the investment in the innovative action be
bounded away from zero (at least q
c
) even when the probability of success in it is very
small (p & 0). The smaller this probability p is, the bigger is the relative satisfaction
from success which is needed in order to induce the individual to follow the socially
optimal behavior.
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Proposition 2 For every strictly increasing function V which satisÞes (4.4)
lim
y→0+
[V (1 + q + y)− V (1 + q − y)] =∞ (5.1)
Proof. Since s∗ in (4.2) maximizes the individual expected utility, we have that for
every s ∈ [0, 1]
pV (1 +
q
1− 2p) + (1− p)V (1−
q
1− 2p) ≥ pV (1 + sc) + (1− p)V (1− sc) (5.2)
In particular, (4.11) holds for s = q−ε
c
for small enough ε > 0 :
pV (1 +
q
1− 2p) + (1− p)V (1−
q
1− 2p) ≥ pV (1 + q − ε) + (1− p)V (1− q + ε), (5.3)
that is
V (1 +
q
1− 2p)− V (1 + q − ε) ≥
1− p
p
µ
V (1− q + ε)− V (1− q
1− 2p)
¶
. (5.4)
Letting p& 0, and using the fact that V is increasing, we get
lim
p→0+
µ
V (1 +
q
1− 2p)− V (1 + q − ε)
¶
≥ lim
p→0+
1− p
p
µ
V (1− q + ε)− V (1− q
1− 2p)
¶
(5.5)
≥ lim
p→0+
1− p
p
(V (1− q + ε)− V (1− q)) =∞
Hence, for small enough ε > 0
lim
x→q+
(V (1 + x)− V (1 + q − ε)) =∞, (5.6)
and since V is strictly increasing, (5.1) follows. ¥
Strictly speaking, V cannot have an inÞnite jump at 1+q and be strictly increasing
in the entire domain. However, we can have two branches for V  to the left and to the
right of 1+q. The left branch will tend to +∞ when approaching 1+q from the left, and
the right branch will tend to −∞ when approaching 1 + q from the right. By adding a
suﬃciently large, Þnite constant to the right branch, V can be well deÞned and increasing
outside an arbitrarily small interval around 1+q. This deÞnition will then be suﬃcient in
order to compare the expected utility of gambles with Þnitely many outcomes (diﬀerent
than 1+q). With this usage of V, the preferences over such gambles are thus well deÞned.
These preferences are lexicographic:
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1. Gamble X will be preferred over gamble Y if X gives a higher probability of getting
more than the aspiration level 1+q. This goal is slightly above the outcome 1, which
the individuals believe can be assured by taking the conservative action.3 This is
the sense in which the individuals are decisive in their desire to do better and bypass
the current status quo.
2. If the two gambles yield the same probability of bypassing the goal 1 + q, their
expected utility has to be compared. This expected utility is the sum of the expec-
tations over the two branches of the utility function  to the left and to the right of
1 + q. In this case, the comparison of the expectations is not sensitive to the large
Þnite jump assumed in the passage from the left branch to the right branch.
A simple such solution to (4.4) is attained from the pair of equations
V 0(1 + x) =
1
x− q
V 0(1− x) = 1
x+ q
which yield
V (y) =
½
+M + log [y − (1 + q)] y > 1 + q + ε
−M − log [(1 + q)− y] y < 1 + q − ε
where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small, and M is large enough to make V increasing.
 
 
1+q
0
 
x
V(y)
Figure 2. A fitness-maximizing utility function
3Recall that the average probability q of the bad state is assumed to be very small, and that the
individuals are not aware of the possibility of such a bad state.
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This utility function is simple in the sense that it does not have any inßection points
other than the critical point 1 + q. It is straightforward to see that any V with branches
to the left and to the right of 1 + q, which can be made strictly increasing by excluding
an arbitrarily small interval around 1 + q and adding a large enough jump between the
branches  such a V is simple in the above sense only if it is convex to the left of 1+ q
and concave to the right of 1 + q.
From the point of view of the Gene, such simplicity is a desirable feature when de-
signing the individual utility function. The qualitative features of the preference relation
are very simple: lexicographic preference for bypassing the status quo and achieving more
than a modest improvement goal, risk loving below this aspiration level and risk aver-
sion beyond it. Quantifying these simple rules of thumb into preferences in individuals
minds is presumably simpler than hard-wiring preferences that involve qualitative twists
at more than one threshold level (as would be required for utility functions with more
inßection points).4
The simple suitable functions are thus S-shaped, as suggested in Prospect Theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979,1981). The inÞnite jump expresses a leading criterion
of bypassing a certain minimal achievement. This reference point is slightly higher than
what can be ascertained by a default action, and thus expresses a constant desire to
improve upon ones situation. Such preferences are congruent with behavior patterns
that are usually associated with Prospect Theory  goal seeking, the sunk cost fallacy
and the escalation of commitment.
6 Conclusion
We conÞned ourselves to a minimal model in order to allow for sharp, analytic results.
We preferred simplicity over richness: Our aim was to point at possible evolutionary
forces which push towards a speciÞc type of observed behavior, not to analyze a whole,
complex arena in which diﬀerent forces lead to many (possibly conßicting) behaviors.
It is a reverse engineering exercise, in which we explore what a commonly observed
bias could potentially serve for in the course of evolution. There is no claim here that
our Þndings constitute the unique explanation for goal-seeking, nor that goal-seeking
is socially optimal in any environment.
As far as we know, our attempt is the Þrst one in the literature to construct an entire
utility function on the basis of evolutionary considerations. Hopefully, a similar approach
may yield further insights into the foundations of human behavior.
4It is probably possible to formalize this evolutionary argument in favor of simple preferences
by introducing more elaborate evolutionary dynamics, in which complex suitable mutations are less
likely to appear than simple ones. It is outside the scope of this work, in which we have conÞned the
discussion to a straightforward selection process.
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